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INTRODUCTION 
 
 Both state law and products liability tort suits regulate 
prescription drugs.1 Generally, a prescription drug manufacturer has a 
duty to warn physicians of any dangerous effects that the manufacturer 
knows or has reason to know are inherent in the use of the prescription 
drug.2 A prescription drug manufacturer that fails to warn a physician 
can be held liable for breach of duty.3 State-law products liability 
claims based on this failure are commonly referred to as “failure-to-
warn claims.” 
 In addition to state regulation, prescription drugs are strictly 
regulated by federal law. The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) 
was created to supplement protection already provided by state 
                                                 
∗ J.D. candidate, May 2011, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology; B.S., Molecular and Cellular Biology, 2005, University of Illinois, 
Urbana-Champaign. 
1 See Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1195 (2009). 
2 Michael A. Rosenhouse, Annotation, Liability of Prescription Drug 
Manufacturer for Drug User’s Suicide or Attempted Suicide, 45 A.L.R. 6th 385 
(2009) (citing 63 AM. JUR. 2D Products Liability § 249). 
3 Id. 
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regulation and common-law products liability.4 The FDCA requires 
that the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)5 approve prescription 
drug labels before the prescription drugs may be distributed for sale.6 
Additionally, the FDCA specifies what information must be included 
on the label, where it must be placed, and how to change information 
on the label.7 Upon a determination that a proposed warning label is 
false or misleading, the FDA will deny approval and distribution of 
that prescription drug.8 Therefore, if the FDA finds that there is 
insufficient evidence that a prescription drug could have the side effect 
listed on the warning label, it will withdraw the drug from 
distribution.9 Additionally, a Changes Being Effected (CBE) 
supplement permits a manufacturer to change its warning label “to 
reflect newly acquired information” without prior FDA approval.10 
 When state and federal regulation of prescription drugs 
conflict, a determination must be made as to whether federal law 
preempts state law. This principle of federal preemption derives from 
the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution.11 A 
preemption analysis is based on the assumption that the historic police 
powers of the states are not to be superseded by federal law unless 
Congress clearly intended it to do so.12 This presumption is 
                                                 
4 Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1195. 
5 “The FDA is charged with ‘promot[ing] the public health by promptly and 
efficiently reviewing [drug manufacturers’] clinical research and taking appropriate 
action on the marketing of regulated products in a timely manner’ and ‘protect[ing] 
the public health by ensuring that . . . drugs are safe and effective.’” Colacicco v. 
Apotex, Inc., 521 F.3d 253, 257 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–397 
(2006)). 
6  See Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–397. 
7 Id. §§ 331, 332, 355.   
8 Id. § 352. 
9 Id. § 355(e).  
10 See 21 C.F.R. 601.12. 
11 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the 
United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or 
which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme 
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in 
the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”).  
12 Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1194 (2009). 
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particularly applicable where matters related to health and safety are 
involved.13 Determining whether a presumption of preemption applies 
is the first step that a court takes in determining whether state law or 
federal law prevails.14   
 Where the court finds no express presumption of preemption, 
the court applies a conflict preemption analysis to determine the 
propriety of preemption.15 Under the doctrine of conflict preemption, 
preemption of state law may be inferred where it is impossible to 
comply with both federal and state law or where state law “stands as 
an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes 
and objectives of Congress.”16 
 Historically, there has been a presumption against preemption 
with regard to prescription drugs.17 Courts have often concluded that, 
because state-law failure-to-warn claims fall within the states’ police 
powers over the health and safety of its citizens, the presumption 
against preemption of state law should apply.18 This view was 
reaffirmed with the 1962 FDCA amendment, in which Congress took 
care to preserve state law by adding a savings clause19 that indicated 
that federal law would preempt state law only upon a “direct and 
20positive conflict” with the FDCA.  Accordingly, state-law failure-to-
                                                 
 See 1962 Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 
76 Stat. 780. 
13 See Hillsborough County, Fla. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 
716 (1985) (in order for federal law to preempt state law, there must be a conflict 
that is strong enough to overcome the presumption that state and local regulation of 
health and safety matters can coexist with federal regulation). 
14 See Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1194–95. 
15 See Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc., 521 F.3d 253, 265 (3d Cir. 2008). 
16 Washington v. Fred’s Stores of Tenn., Inc., 427 F. Supp. 2d 725, 730 (S.D. 
Miss. 2006). 
17 See e.g., Hillsborough County, 471 U.S. at 715–16. 
18 See id. 
19 “The intention of Congress in inserting a savings clause is not to preserve 
common law claims when they conflict with federal regulatory standards, but to 
prevent a manufacturer from having a complete defense to a common law action not 
addressed by a standard by merely stating that it is in full compliance with all federal 
safety standards.” 63B AM. JUR. 2D Products Liability § 1923 (2010).  
20
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warn claims continued to evade preemption despite FDA 
regulations.21 
 In 2001, the landscape of federal preemption began to change. 
Many prescription drug manufacturers began filing preemption 
motions in the district courts, and in many of these cases, the FDA 
filed amicus briefs in support of these manufacturers.22 This was the 
first step in the movement toward federal preemption. The preamble to 
Congress’s 2006 FDCA amendment strengthened this movement by 
expressly stating that preemption applies to “claims that a 
[manufacturer] breached an obligation to warn by failing to include a 
statement in labeling or in advertising, the substance of which had 
been proposed to FDA for inclusion in labeling, if that statement was 
not required by FDA at the time plaintiff claims the [manufacturer] 
had an obligation to warn.”23 This amendment also provided for 
“changes being effected” supplements, which allowed manufacturers 
to change labels prior to FDA approval based on newly acquired 
information.24 
 The Third Circuit was the first federal court of appeals to 
address the issue of preemption in the context of prescription drugs.25 
In Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc., the court considered whether action taken 
by the FDA and its corresponding regulatory scheme preempted the 
plaintiffs’ state-law failure-to-warn claims.26 Based upon its 
consideration of the presumption against preemption, Congressional 
intent, and the FDA’s actions taken pursuant to its statutorily-granted 
authority, the Third Circuit held that the plaintiffs’ state-law failure-to-
27warn claims conflicted with federal law, and thus were preempted.  
                                                 
21 See, e.g., Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 340 (2008) (Ginsburg, J., 
disse
on v. SmithKline Beecham Corp. (Mason I), 546 F. Supp. 2d 618, 625 
(C.D
21. 
nting) (“By the time Congress enacted the MDA in 1976, state common-law 
tort claims for drug labeling and design defects had continued unabated despite 
nearly four decades of FDA regulation.”). 
22 Id. 
23 Mas
. Ill. 2008) (citing Colacicco, 521 F.3d at 269). 
24 Colacicco, 521 F.3d at 259. 
25 Mason I, 546 F. Supp. 2d at 6
26 521 F.3d at 256. 
27 Id. at 276. 
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Because the Seventh Circuit had yet to address the issue of preemptio
in the context of prescription drugs, the district court in Mason v. 
SmithKline Beecham Corporation relied upon the Third Circuit’s 
reasoning in Colacicco.
n 
d 
te 
, the United States Supreme Court was given the 
e 
. 
w 
ce 
t 
reconsider 
e.  The 
 
e 
                                                
28 The court held that, because the FDA ha
repeatedly rejected the warning label that the plaintiffs contended sta
law required, the plaintiffs’ state-law failure-to-warn claims were 
preempted.29  
 In 2009
opportunity to consider the presumption against preemption in th
context of prescription drugs.30 In its landmark decision in Wyeth v
Levine, the Supreme Court “restored the landscape of federal 
preemption to its pre-2001 form.”31 The Court established a ne
standard for federal preemption.32 It held that, absent clear eviden
that the FDA would not have approved a prescription drug label that 
the plaintiffs asserted was required by state law, federal law would no
preempt the plaintiffs’ state-law failure-to-warn claims.33   
 The Seventh Circuit recently had the opportunity to 
the lower court’s decision in Mason v. SmithKline Beecham 
Corporation in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Levin 34
Seventh Circuit adopted the standard set forth in Levine—absent clear 
evidence that the FDA would not have approved a drug labeling 
change, state-law failure-to-warn claims are not preempted.35 The
court used the facts in Levine as a baseline to determine whether th
manufacturer effectively demonstrated that the FDA would not have 
approved the label change that the plaintiffs asserted was required by 
state law.36 The court found insufficient facts to establish clear 
 
28 See Mason I, 546 F. Supp. 2d at 621. 
 Ct. 1187 (2009). 
mithKline Beecham Corp. (Mason II), 596 F.3d 387, 391 (7th Cir. 
2010
Id. 
ence were less compelling than it was in 
Levin court would not find preemption). 
29 Id. at 626. 
30 See generally Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S.
31 Mason v. S
). 
32 See Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1198. 
33 
34 See Mason II, 596 F.3d at 391. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. at 392 (stating that if the evid
e, the 
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evidence and thus, held that FDA regulations did not preempt th
plaintiffs’ state-law failure-to-warn claims.
e 
nth 
r evidence” 
 
safety 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Federal and S egul t o  f rescription Drugs 
Prescription drugs are regulated by both state law and products 
ability
 
bears the burden of proving that the manufacturer failed to adequately 
warn him of any risks associated with the prescription drug and that 
37 In doing so, the Seve
Circuit overturned the decision of the lower court. 
 The Seventh Circuit’s adoption of the “clea
standard reflects an apparent shift toward a presumption against
preemption. Admittedly, states have an interest in the health and 
of their citizens; however, the shortcomings of the presumption against 
preemption outweigh this interest. This Note analyzes the presumption 
against preemption in the context of prescription drugs and argues that 
Congress should enact an express preemption clause for prescription 
drugs similar to the Medical Device Amendments of 1976.38 
 
tate R a i n o P
 
 
li  tort suits.39 Generally, a prescription drug manufacturer has a 
duty to warn physicians of any dangerous effects that the manufacturer
knows or has reason to know are inherent in the use of the prescription 
drug.40 If the manufacturer does not effectively warn the physician, 
the manufacturer can be held liable for a breach of duty.41 State 
products liability actions based on this failure to provide adequate 
warnings are commonly known as “failure-to-warn” claims.42 To 
successfully bring a common law failure-to-warn claim, the consumer 
                                                 
37 Id. at 396 (finding that the manufacturer did not meet its burden of 
demonstrating by clear evidence that the FDA would have rejected a label change). 
38 This statute provides that, after a medical device receives FDA pre-market 
approval, a state may not establish or enforce any requirement that (1) is different 
from, or in addition to, any requirement applicable under federal law, and (2) relates 
to the safety or effectiveness of the device. 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (2006). 
39 See Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1195. 
40 Rosenhouse, supra note 2. 
41 Id. 
42 See 63A AM. JUR. 2D Products Liability § 1240 (2010). 
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the failure to warn was the proximate cause of the consumer’s 
injury.43   
 Prescription drugs are also strictly regulated by federal law. 
The FDCA requires approval of a prescription drug’s ngwarni  label 
 
st 
 
  
reemp at 
ere 
urts 
                                                
before it may be distributed for sale.44 The FDCA specifies what risk
information must be included in the label, where the information mu
appear, and how to change information on the label.45 Where the FDA
finds that a warning label is false or misleading, it will deny approval 
of the prescription drug.46 Additionally, the FDA will withdraw 
approval of any prescription drug already on the market upon receipt 
of information that there is a lack of substantial evidence that a 
prescription drug will have the effect that the warning label suggests.47
 When state and federal regulation of prescription drugs 
conflict, a determination must be made as to whether federal law 
p ts state law. In these situations, some courts have held th
state-law products liability claims based on inadequate warnings w
preempted, or supplanted, by FDA regulation.48 However, other co
have concluded that state-law failure-to-warn claims fall within the 
states’ police powers to regulate the health and safety of their citizens, 
and thus, a presumption against preemption should apply.49 
 
 
 
43 Rosenhouse, supra note 2. 
44 See Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1195. 
45 21 U.S.C. §§ 331, 332, 355 (2006).   
46 Id. § 352. 
47 Id. § 355(e).  
48 See, e.g., O’Neal v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 551 F. Supp. 2d 993, 1009 
(E.D. Cal. 2008) (holding that the plaintiff’s state law claim based on an inadequate 
warning label was preempted by federal law); see also Dusek v. Pfizer Inc., No. 
Civ.A. H-02-3559, 2004 WL 2191804 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 20, 2004).  
49 See supra text accompanying note 14. 
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A. Federal Preemption Generally  
 
 The principle of federal preemption,50 that federal law can 
supplant inconsistent state law, derives from the Supremacy Clause of 
the United States Constitution.51 There are three different types of 
federal preemption.52 The first type of preemption, known as express 
preemption, preempts state law where a federal statute unequivocally 
states that its provisions preempt state law.53 The second and third 
types of preemption, field preemption and conflict preemption, fall 
into the category of implied preemption.54 Under implied preemption, 
state-law claims are preempted where “Congressional intent is inferred 
from the existence of a pervasive regulatory scheme” or where “state 
law conflicts with federal law or interferes with the achievement of 
federal objectives.”55 Specifically, under the doctrine of field 
preemption, federal preemption may be inferred from Congress’s 
intent to control an entire regulatory field.56 Under the doctrine of 
conflict preemption, preemption of state law may be inferred where it 
                                                 
50 Here, federal preemption refers to ordinary preemption rather than to 
complete preemption. Ordinary preemption is a federal defense to plaintiff’s state-
law claim and may arise either expressly by statute or by a direct conflict between 
state and federal law. Washington v. Fred’s Stores of Tenn., Inc., 427 F. Supp. 2d 
725, 727 (S.D. Miss. 2006). Complete preemption, however, is jurisdictional in 
nature and authorizes removal to federal court. Id.  
51 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the 
United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or 
which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme 
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in 
the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”). 
52 Washington, 427 F. Supp. 2d at 728. 
53 Id. (“Under express preemption, the federal statute must clearly state that its 
provisions preempt state law.”). 
54 Id. (“The second and third categories of ordinary preemption, field 
preemption and conflict preemption, must be implied from the circumstances.”). 
Express and implied preemption differ in that, in an implied preemption analysis, it 
is possible to infer Congressional intent to preempt state law based only on the effect 
that allowing state law products liability claims would have on the federal scheme 
established by Congress. 63B AM. JUR. 2D Products Liability § 1923 (2010). 
55 Washington, 427 F. Supp. 2d at 728.   
56 63B AM. JUR. 2D Products Liability § 1923. 
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is impossible to comply with both federal and state law or where state 
law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the 
full purposes and objectives of Congress.”57  
 
B. Federal Preemption in the Context of Prescription Drugs 
 
 All three categories of federal preemption require a court to 
discern Congressional intent.58 Where Congress has not explicitly 
stated that federal law preempts state law, preemption may be implied 
where there is an actual conflict between state law and the federal 
regulatory scheme.59 Courts have traditionally applied a presumption 
against preemption unless a person or entity that is seeking to have the 
law preempted demonstrates that there is clear Congressional intent to 
preclude the states from acting.60  
 The most commonly implicated category of preemption in the 
context of prescription drugs is conflict preemption, which is 
implicated when it is impossible for a prescription drug manufacturer 
to comply with both state and federal prescription drug regulations.61 
Courts have often concluded that, because state-law failure-to-warn 
claims fall within the states’ police powers over the health and safety 
of its citizens, the presumption against preemption should apply.62   
 Until 1962, the FDA carried the burden of proving that a 
prescription drug was unsafe to prevent distribution of that 
prescription drug.63 In 1962, however, Congress amended the FDCA 
to require manufacturers to demonstrate that their prescription drugs 
were “safe for use under the conditions prescribed, recommended, or 
suggested in the proposed labeling” before they could be distributed.64 
This amendment effectively shifted the burden of proof from the FDA 
                                                 
57 Washington, 427 F. Supp. 2d at 730. 
58 Id. 
59 63B AM. JUR. 2D Products Liability § 1923. 
60 See e.g., Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 907 (2000).   
61 Washington, 427 F. Supp. 2d at 730. 
62 Hillsborough County, Fla. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 
715–16 (1985). 
63 Id. 
64 Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1195 (2009). 
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to the manufacturer.65 Significantly, Congress took care to preserve 
state law by adding a savings clause to this amendment,66 which stated 
that federal law would preempt state law only upon a “direct and 
positive conflict” with the FDCA.67 Accordingly, plaintiffs continue to 
successfully bring state-law failure-to-warn claims despite FDA 
regulations.68  
 Until the early 2000s, prescription drug manufacturers rarely 
invoked the defense of federal preemption.69 Notably, when 
manufacturers asserted this defense, they rarely succeeded.70 
However, this began to change in 2001, when many prescrip
manufacturers began filing preemption motions in the district courts, 
and in many of these cases, the FDA filed amicus briefs in support of 
these manufacturers.
tion drug 
                                                
71 This was the first step in the movement away 
from a presumption against preemption. 
 This movement toward preemption was bolstered by 
Congress’s 2007 FDCA amendment. The preamble to this amendment 
expressly states that preemption applies to “claims that a 
[manufacturer] breached an obligation to warn by failing to include a 
statement in labeling or in advertising, the substance of which had 
been proposed to FDA for inclusion in labeling, if that statement was 
not required by FDA at the time plaintiff claims the [manufacturer] 
had an obligation to warn.”72 The 2007 amendment also granted the 
 
65 See 1962 Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 
76 Stat. 780. 
66 “The intention of Congress in inserting a savings clause is not to preserve 
common law claims when they conflict with federal regulatory standards, but to 
prevent a manufacturer from having a complete defense to a common law action not 
addressed by a standard by merely stating that it is in full compliance with all federal 
safety standards.” 63B AM. JUR. 2D Products Liability § 1923 (2010). 
67 See 1962 Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 
76 Stat. 780. 
68 See supra text accompanying note 22.   
69 Mason v. SmithKline Beecham Corp. (Mason II), 596 F.3d 387, 391 (7th Cir. 
2010). 
70 Id. 
71 Id. 
72 Mason v. SmithKline Beecham Corp. (Mason I), 546 F. Supp. 2d 618, 625 
(C.D. Ill. 2008) (citing Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc., 521 F.3d 253, 269 (3d Cir. 2008)).  
 317
10
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 1 [2010], Art. 10
http://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol6/iss1/10
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                          Volume 6, Issue 1                            Fall 2010 
 
FDA statutory authority to require manufacturers to alter their 
prescription drug labels based on safety information discovered after 
initial FDA approval.73 By choosing not to enact any provision that 
would have required FDA preapproval for all label changes, Congress 
reinforced its position that manufacturers were responsible for 
updating their own labels.74  
 
C. Cases Holding That Failure-to-Warn Claims are Preempted 
 
 The Third Circuit was the first appellate court to extensively 
address the issue of preemption in the context of suicide from 
prescription drugs, in Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc.75 There, the court 
considered whether action taken by the FDA and its corresponding 
regulatory scheme preempted the plaintiffs’ state-law failure-to-warn 
claims.76 
 SmithKline Beecham, doing business as GlaxoSmithKline 
(GSK), manufactures the antidepressant Paxil, a selective serotonin 
reuptake inhibitor (SSRI).77 Lois Colacicco, a fifty-five-year-old 
woman, was prescribed Paxil on October 6, 2003, to treat 
depression.78 Shortly thereafter, Colacicco began taking the generic 
version of Paxil, manufactured by Apotex, Inc.79 Less than a month 
later, Colacicco committed suicide.80 At the time of her death, t
label for the prescription drug included a warning, identical to that of 
Paxil, which stated that the “possibility of suicide attempt is inher
in major depressive disorder and may persist until significant 
he 
ent 
                                                 
73 See 21 U.S.C.A. § 355 (West 2011). 
74Id. (citing S. 1082, 110th Cong. § 208 (2007) (as passed) (proposing new § 
506D
21. 
cicco, 521 F.3d at 256. 
)). 
75 Mason I, 546 F. Supp. 2d at 6
76 Cola
77 Id. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
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re on occurs.”missi
tex 
ith 
 federal 
rt 
ents 
ly.  Thus, the court was faced with the issue of whether the 
laintif
ere 
ted that 
81 The label failed to warn of any increased risk of 
suicide.82 
 After her death, Colacicco’s husband filed suit against Apo
and GSK in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania.83 Mr. Colacicco alleged that both Apotex and GSK 
violated state common-law tort rules by selling prescription drugs w
labels that failed to warn patients about the increased risk of suicide.84 
Both manufacturers moved for dismissal on the ground that
law preempted the state-law failure-to-warn claim.85 The district cou
dismissed Colacicco’s claim on the basis of preemption.86  
 On appeal, Colacicco argued that because CBE supplem
allowed manufacturers to strengthen and augment prescription drug 
warning labels without prior FDA approval, the FDA labeling 
requirements “constitute[d] mere minimum standards of information 
that may be required in their labeling.”87 Thus, it was possible for 
GSK to comply with both state and federal labeling regulations.88 In 
response, the manufacturers argued that, even though changes made 
under CBE regulation do not require prior FDA approval, the FDA has 
the final authority on the legality of those labels, and thus preemption 
should app 89
p fs’ state-law failure-to-warn claims conflicted with the federal 
scheme.90 
 In its analysis, the Third Circuit first considered whether th
was an applicable presumption of preemption.91 The court no
in all preemption cases, the analysis begins with the presumption 
                                                 
81 Id. 
d. (citing Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 514, 537–39 (E.D. Pa. 
2006
t 268. 
t 262. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. 
86 I
)). 
87 Id. a
88 Id. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. a
91 Id. 
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against preemption, particularly in cases that involve a field 
traditionally regulated by the states, unless Congress made its
preempt state law clear and manifest.
 intent to 
 
as 
.94 
te 
ngress 
plicable when compliance with both federal and state 
 
 
                                                
92 Courts that have applied a
presumption against preemption tend to premise it on the fact that 
states have the power to protect the health and safety of their 
citizens.93 In this case, the plaintiffs argued that preemption w
inappropriate because Congress never expressly stated its intent to 
preempt state-law tort actions challenging prescription drug labeling
However, the manufacturers contended that a presumption of 
preemption applied to this case because the federal government, not 
the states, had traditionally regulated prescription drug labeling.95  
 The Third Circuit looked to the purpose of Congress to 
determine whether there was any express intent for preemption of sta
law.96 In considering the arguments of both sides, the court found a 
lack of Congressional directive expressly approving or rejecting 
preemption in the context of prescription drugs.97 Because Co
did not expressly state its intent to approve or reject preemption in the 
context of prescription drugs, the court applied a conflict preemption 
analysis to determine the propriety of preemption.98 Conflict 
preemption is ap
regulations is impossible or when “state law stands as an obstacle to
the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives 
of Congress.”99 
 The plaintiff argued that conflict preemption did not apply 
because it was possible for GSK to comply with both state and federal 
law.100 GSK argued that, because the CBE supplement allowed 
prescription drug manufacturers to strengthen warning labels without
 
 note 14. 
cicco, 521 F.3d at 263.  
5. 
orough County, Fla. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 
U.S. )). 
8. 
92 Id. at 268. 
93 See supra text accompanying
94 Cola
95 Id. 
96 Id. at 264. 
97 Id. at 26
98 Id. 
99 Id. (citing Hillsb
707, 713 (1985
100 Id. at 26
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prior FDA approval, the FDA labeling requirements constituted m
minimum standards.
ere 
r the 
epeatedly rejected the warning label of increased risk of 
uicide.
re-to-
o a 
.”  
ing asserting the 
the 
A’s 
 
d that the FDA had remained consistent in its position 
that the plaintiff’s claims were preempted as a result of the FDA’s 
                                                
101 However, the court looked to the FDA’s past 
treatment of warning labels for Paxil and found that for over twenty 
years, the FDA had actively monitored the potential connection 
between suicide and SSRIs and, in finding no scientific basis fo
connection, r
s 102 The FDA determined that the inclusion of such a warning 
without scientific basis would constitute false and misleading 
labeling.103  
 Additionally, in determining whether the plaintiff’s failu
warn claim should be preempted, the Third Circuit considered the 
FDA’s actions taken pursuant to its statutorily-granted authority.104 
The FDCA authorizes the FDA to prohibit false or misleading 
prescription drug labeling.105 The standard for adding a warning t
prescription drug label is the existence of “reasonable evidence of a 
causal association [of a clinically significant hazard] with a drug 106
Thus, any state law obligation to include a warn
existence of an association between SSRIs and suicidality when 
FDA had determined that the evidence did not support such an 
association would constitute false labeling.107  
 Another factor that the court considered was the FD
position on federal preemption.108 The court found that the FDA had
remained consistent in its position that it had the duty to establish 
prescription drug warning requirements.109 The court also 
acknowledge
 
uirements for Prescription Drugs and/or Insulin, 21 C.F.R. § 
201.5
Requirements for Prescription Drugs and/or Insulin, 21 C.F.R. 
§ 201 6). 
521 F.3d at 253. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. 
105 Labeling Req
6(a)(2) (2006). 
106 See Labeling 
.57(c) (200
107 See id. 
108 Colacicco, 
109 Id. at 276. 
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repeated rejection of warning labels based on insufficient scientific 
evidence.110 
 Based on the court’s review of FDA regulations, the FDA
actions taken pursuant to its statutorily-granted authority, an
FDA’s position
’s 
d the 
 on federal preemption, the court found that the 
t, 
-law 
 
emption.  The court granted summary judgment and 
re 
ir 
ence 
 
                                                
plaintiff’s failure-to-warn claims were preempted by FDA 
regulation.111 
 In Mason v. SmithKline Beecham Corporation, the United 
States District Court for the Central District of Illinois was presented 
with a case strikingly similar to Colacicco. In this case the defendan
SmithKline Beecham (SKB), manufactured Paxil.112 Two days after 
the plaintiffs’ daughter, twenty-three-year-old Tricia Mason, began 
taking Paxil, she committed suicide.113 The plaintiffs filed a state
claim against SKB, alleging that SKB failed to warn consumers about 
the dangerous side effects of the prescription drug, including an 
increased risk of self-harm.114 SKB moved for summary judgment on
the basis of pre 115
held that the plaintiffs’ state-law tort claims for failure to warn we
preempted.116 
 Like the manufacturer in Colacicco, SKB argued that the 
plaintiffs’ claims were preempted based on proposed warnings that 
directly conflicted with the FDA-approved labeling for Paxil.117 The 
plaintiffs, however, contended that the court should not find that the
state-law failure-to-warn claims were preempted absent clear evid
of a conflict between state and federal regulations.118 The plaintiffs 
further argued that conflict preemption did not apply to this case 
because it was possible for SKB to comply with both state and federal
 
 SmithKline Beecham Corp. (Mason I), 546 F. Supp. 2d 618, 619 
(C.D 08). 
110 Id. at 274. 
111 Id. at 275. 
112 Mason v.
. Ill. 20
113 Id. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. at 620. 
116 Id. at 627. 
117 Id. at 620. 
118 Id. at 619. 
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law.119 This argument was premised on the fact that manufacturers are 
permitted to strengthen warning labels, without prior FDA approval, 
through CBE supplements.120 Thus, the plaintiffs contended that SKB 
dress 
re preempted in the context of prescription 
on 
ded 
aw 
 itself to federal liability, including the 
ossibility that the FDA would withdraw its approval of Paxil for false 
or misleading labeling.128 
 
                                                
could have strengthened the warning label for Paxil and still have met 
the minimum FDCA labeling requirements.121  
 To determine whether it was possible for SKB to comply with 
both state and federal regulations, the district court applied a conflict 
preemption analysis.122 Because the Seventh Circuit had yet to ad
whether state-law claims we
drugs, the district court looked to the Third Circuit’s decision in 
Colacicco for guidance.123 
 The plaintiffs’ state-law failure-to-warn claims were based 
the fact that the prescription drug labeling for Paxil was false or 
misleading due to its failure to warn consumers of any risk of self-
harm.124 The court rejected the plaintiffs’ claims and followed the 
Third Circuit’s reasoning that, where a plaintiff’s proposed labeling 
change conflicts with FDA-approved labeling, state-law failure-to-
warn claims are preempted.125 The court noted that any other outcome 
would present a direct conflict for SKB.126 If SKB complied with 
federal law, it would be exposed to substantial liability from state tort 
law claims for failing to add a warning that the plaintiffs conten
was necessary under state law.127  If SKB acted to avoid state tort l
claims by adding the warning that the plaintiffs contended was 
necessary, it would expose
p
 
119 Id. at 623. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. at 621. 
123 Id.  
124 Id. at 626. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. 
128 Id. 
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D. Wyeth v. Levine: Failure-to-Warn Claim Only Preempted 
upon “Clear Evidence” 
 Almost a year after the Third Circuit’s decision in Colacicco, 
the United States Supreme Court was faced with the issue of 
preemption in the context of prescription drugs in Wyeth v. Levine.129 
This landmark decision restored the federal preemption landscape to 
its pre-2001 form.130  
 Wyeth manufacturers Phenergan, an antihistamine prescribed 
to treat nausea.131 Phenergan is a corrosive prescription drug that can 
cause gangrene upon entry into a patient’s artery.132 Phenergan may be 
injected intravenously through either the “IV-push” method133 or the 
“IV-drip” method.134 On April 7, 2000, Diana Levine went to her 
health care clinic, where she was prescribed Phenergan to treat nausea 
associated with her migraine.135 The physician administered the 
Phenergan through the IV-push method, as opposed to the IV-drip 
method.136 The Phenergan accidentally entered Levine’s artery, 
causing gangrene to develop in her right hand and forearm, both of 
which had to be amputated as a result.137 
 Levine contended that Phenergan’s labeling failed to 
adequately warn physicians about the risk of IV-push administration, a 
warning that Levine argued was required by state law.138 Wyeth filed 
a motion for summary judgment; its argument was premised on the 
                                                 
129 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1193 (2009). 
130 Mason v. SmithKline Beecham Corp. (Mason II), 596 F.3d 387, 391 (7th 
Cir. 2010). 
131 Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1191. 
132 Id. 
133 This method of administration involves injecting Phenergan directly into a 
patient’s vein. Id. 
134 This method of administration involves adding Phenergan to a saline 
solution and allowing the liquid to slowly enter through a catheter inserted into the 
patient’s vein. Id. 
135 Id. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. at 1191, 1194. 
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notion that Levine’s failure-to-warn claims were preempted by federal 
law.139  
 The trial court found no merit in Wyeth’s conflict preemption 
argument, stating that there was no evidence that the FDA had 
“specifically disallowed” stronger language.140 The Vermont Supreme 
Court affirmed the trial court’s denial of Wyeth’s motion for summary 
judgment, holding that Wyeth could have, through the FDA’s CBE 
regulation, warned against the IV-push administration without prior 
FDA approval and that the FDA’s requirements are minimal standards 
that do not create a ceiling for state-law warning label requirements.141 
 The issue presented to the United States Supreme Court was 
whether FDA prescription drug labeling requirements preempt state-
law failure-to-warn claims premised on the theory that different 
labeling judgments were necessary to make prescription drugs 
reasonably safe for use.142 Wyeth argued that it was impossible for it 
to comply with both state and federal labeling requirements and that 
recognition of the plaintiff’s state-law failure-to-warn claim creates an 
“obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes 
and objectives of Congress” by transferring prescription drug labeling 
decision-making from the experts of the FDA to a lay jury.143 
 The Supreme Court first considered the purpose expressed by 
Congress.144 Traditionally, courts begin with a presumption against 
preemption, based on the policy that historic police powers are not to 
be superseded by federal law unless there is clear intent by Congress 
to do so.145 Wyeth contended that the presumption against preemption 
should not apply because the FDA had regulated prescription drug 
labeling for more than a century, demonstrating clear Congressional 
intent for federal preemption.146 Additionally, Wyeth argued that the 
                                                 
139 Id. at 1192. 
140 Id. 
141 Id. at 1193. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. 
144 Id. at 1195. 
145 Id. 
146 Id. 
 325
18
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 1 [2010], Art. 10
http://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol6/iss1/10
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                          Volume 6, Issue 1                            Fall 2010 
 
plaintiff’s state-law failure-to-warn claim was preempted because it 
was impossible to comply with state and federal regulations—a classic 
conflict-preemption case.147 It argued that the CBE supplement, which 
permits a manufacturer to strengthen a warning label without prior 
FDA approval, was not implicated in this case because the 2006 
amendment provides only that a manufacturer may change its label to 
reflect newly acquired information.148 Wyeth asserted that it could 
only have changed the label in response to new information not yet 
considered by the FDA, and thus it was impossible for it to strengthen 
its label to comply with state-law requirements without violating 
federal law.149  
 The Court, however, found that Wyeth could have 
strengthened its claim though a CBE supplement because, in its notice 
of the final rule, the FDA explained that “newly acquired information” 
is not limited to new data but also includes new analyses of previously 
submitted data.150 The plaintiff presented evidence of at least twenty 
incidents prior to her injury in which injection of the prescription drug 
resulted in gangrene and amputation.151 She argued that Wyeth could 
and should have analyzed the acquired data and, through a CBE 
supplement, added a stronger warning label about the IV-push 
administration of the prescription drug.152 Ultimately, the Court held 
that absent clear evidence that the FDA would not have approved a 
change to Phenergan’s label, it would not conclude that it was 
impossible for Wyeth to comply with both federal and state 
requirements.153 While the Court found no preemption in Levine, it 
stated that preemption could be found where the manufacturer meets a 
strict standard of proving that there was clear evidence that the FDA 
                                                 
147 Id. at 1196. 
148 Id. 
149 Id. 
150 Id. at 1197. 
151 Id. 
152 Id. 
153 Id. at 1198. 
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would not have approved the proposed change(s) in the prescription 
drug’s label.154  
 
III. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S RETURN TO A PRESUMPTION AGAINST 
PREEMPTION 
 In Mason v. SmithKline Beecham Corporation, the Seventh 
Circuit reconsidered the lower court’s decision in light of Levine.155 
The court adopted the standard set forth in Levine—absent clear 
evidence that the FDA would not have approved a drug labeling 
change, state-law failure-to-warn claims are not preempted.156 The 
court found that the Supreme Court failed to clarify what constitutes 
“clear evidence” and that the only thing that was apparent was that the 
evidence presented in Levine did not constitute “clear evidence” such 
that preemption would apply.157 Therefore, the court was faced with 
the task of interpreting the Levine “clear evidence” standard.158  
 The court used Levine as a benchmark to determine whether 
GSK had presented “clear evidence” that the FDA would not have 
approved the plaintiffs’ proposed labeling change.159 If the evidence 
were found to be less compelling than the evidence in Levine, the 
court would reject GSK’s argument that federal law preempted the 
state-law failure-to-warn claim.160 
 In Levine, the Supreme Court first reviewed the administrative 
history of Phenergan. It found that the record in Levine clearly 
proffered ample evidence that the “FDA specifically considered and 
reconsidered the strength of Phenergan’s IV-push-related warnings in 
light of new scientific and medical data.”161 Additionally, there was 
evidence that, instead of banning the administration of Phenergan 
                                                 
154 Id. at 1204. 
155 Mason v. SmithKline Beecham Corp. (Mason II), 596 F.3d 387, 391 (7th 
Cir. 2010). 
156 Id. 
157 Id. 
158 See id. 
159 Id. at 392. 
160 Id. 
161 Id. at 393 (quoting Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1222 (2009)). 
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through the IV-push method altogether, Wyeth and FDA authorities 
agreed that there was a need for better warning of the problems of 
intra-arterial injection.162 A year later, the FDA committee 
recommended a stronger label for Phenergan regarding the IV-push 
method but decided not to prohibit the administration of the 
prescription drug through the IV-push method.163 Ultimately, the 
Supreme Court found that it was clear from the administrative history 
of Phenergan that the FDA had “strongly considered a similar warning 
to the one that plaintiff proposed and the Court still did not find 
preemption.”164 
 Following the Supreme Court’s analysis in Levine, the Seventh 
Circuit examined the administrative history of Paxil.165 In 1989, GSK 
filed a prescription drug application with the FDA seeking market 
approval of its new prescription drug, Paxil.166 At the time of its 
approval, the FDA did not require any warnings of suicide risk.167 
From the date of its approval through February 2003, GSK’s analysis 
of suicides and suicide attempts of patients taking Paxil found no 
relationship between suicide and Paxil.168 Additionally, the FDA had 
been thoroughly reviewing the available data about prescription drugs 
such as Paxil and determined that there was no increased risk of 
suicide resulting from consumption of these prescription drugs.169 
GSK also pointed to the FDA’s failure to require a warning about the 
risk of suicide just before the suicide in this case as evidence that the 
FDA would not have approved the increased warning that the 
plaintiffs contended state law required.170  
 However, in a press release in October 2003, the FDA 
recommended that physicians stop prescribing Paxil to children 
because it was investigating the increased risk of suicide resulting 
                                                 
162 Id. 
163 Id. 
164 Id. 
165 Id. 
166 Id. 
167 Id. 
168 Id. at 394. 
169 Id. 
170 Id. at 395. 
 328
21
Hart: Federal Preemption of State-Law Failure-to-Warn Claims: Has the P
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2010
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                          Volume 6, Issue 1                            Fall 2010 
 
from consumption of this prescription drug.171 The court found that, in 
light of this evidence, it seemed unlikely that the FDA would have 
refused to allow GSK to submit a label change to warn Paxil 
consumers about the potential risk of suicide for young adults.172 
Considering the administrative history of Paxil as a whole, the court 
concluded that the evidence fell short of demonstrating by “clear 
evidence” that the FDA would not have approved the label change that 
the plaintiffs contended was required by state law.173 Therefore, the 
Seventh Circuit overturned the decision of the lower court and held 
that the plaintiffs’ state-law failure-to-warn claims were not preempted 
by FDA regulations.174 
 
IV. THE IMPACT OF A PRESUMPTION AGAINST PREEMPTION 
 Prior to Levine, state-law failure-to-warn claims were 
preempted where the FDA had rejected warnings that plaintiffs 
contended should have been included in the warning label.175  In other 
words, because imposing state tort liability for failure-to-warn would 
conflict with FDA-approved labeling, federal law preempted these 
state-law failure-to-warn claims. However, after Levine, state-law 
failure-to-warn claims have been preempted only where the 
manufacturer meets the strict burden of proving that there is clear 
evidence that the FDA would not have approved the proposed 
change(s) in the label.176 Mason v. SmithKline Beecham Corp. reflects 
the Seventh Circuit’s clear shift toward the presumption against 
preemption. Admittedly, states have an interest in the health and safety 
of their citizens; however, the harms resulting from the presumption 
against preemption outweigh this interest. An adoption of an express 
preemption clause similar to the Medical Device Amendments of 1976 
                                                 
171 Id. 
172 Id. 
173 Id. 
174 Id. at 396. 
175 See generally Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc., 521 F.3d 253 (3d Cir. 2008); see 
also Mason II, 596 F.3d at 387. 
176 Mason II, 596 F.3d at 391. 
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(MDA) would solve many of the harms of the current standard for 
prescription drug preemption. 
 
A. Harms Resulting from the Presumption Against Preemption 
 First, recognition of state-law failure-to-warn claims subjects 
prescription drug manufacturers to a multitude of state laws. Standards 
of care for prescription drug labeling vary from state to state.177 
“Absent a determination that the FDA-approved labeling and the 
FDA’s refusal to require the warnings suggested by plaintiffs . . . 
preempt start tort actions, the manufacturers may be subjected to 
considerable liability based on varying standards, with no benchmark 
that they should follow.”178 A national standard for prescription drug 
labeling requirements would ease the burden on prescription drug 
manufacturers of complying with the fifty-one separate regulatory 
schemes of each state and the federal government.   
 Additionally, state-law failure-to-warn claims substitute a lay 
jury’s decision regarding prescription drug labeling for the expert 
judgment of the FDA.179 New prescription drugs must obtain the 
FDA’s stamp of approval as “safe” and “effective” before being 
marketed to the public.180 Once a product is on the market, the FDCA 
employs the FDA to monitor new information and authorizes it to 
withdraw approval in light of new safety concerns.181 A state tort 
regime which allows a lay jury to make important decisions about 
prescription drug labeling is incompatible with this scheme. 
 State-law failure-to-warn claims may also lead to 
unsubstantiated warning labels. A highly probable risk of holding a 
prescription drug manufacturer strictly liable for failure to warn of any 
“knowable” risk is the destruction of the viability of any warnings. If 
every report of a possible risk, no matter how speculative, imposed an 
affirmative duty to give some warning, a manufacturer would be 
                                                 
177 Colacicco, 521 F.3d at 267. 
178 Id. at 267–68. 
179 See Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1194 (2009). 
180 See id. at 1195. 
181 21 U.S.C. § 355(e) (2006). 
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required to provide notice to all physicians of even the slightest risks, 
thereby diluting the force of any specific warning.182 
Lastly, recognition of state law failure-to-warn claims stifles 
medical research and testing. Courts have noted for many years that 
prescription drug tort liability could deter manufacturers from 
developing and marketing prescription drugs.183 Highly beneficial, 
commonly used drugs are often incapable of being made entirely 
safe.184 Additionally, because of lack of time and opportunity for 
sufficient medical experience, there can be no assurance of safety for 
many new or experimental drugs.185 However, medical advancement 
justifies the development, marketing, and use of the drug 
notwithstanding a medically recognizable risk. 
 
B. The Medical Device Amendments of 1976 (MDA)  
 Until Congress’s enactment of the MDA, the introduction of 
new medical devices was left largely to each state to supervise and 
regulate in any particular manner.186 However, the landscape of 
medical device regulation began to change in the 1960s and 1970s, 
when many complex medical devices thrived and some began to 
fail.187 The most notable medical device failure was the Dalkon 
Shield, an intrauterine device that failed in 1970, leading to many 
serious infections and deaths.188 Unfortunately, thousands of resulti
tort claims also failed.
ng 
the 
                                                
189 Many believed that this demonstrated 
inability of the common law tort regime to manage risks associated 
 
182 See Carlin v. Super. Ct. of Sutter Cnty., 920 P.2d 1347, 1360–61 (Cal. 
1996). 
183 Id. at 1357. 
184 Id. at 1358. 
185 Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965)). 
186 Riegel v. Medtronic, 552 U.S. 312, 315 (2008). 
187 Id. 
188 Id. 
189 Id. 
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with dangerous medical devices.190 As a result, Congress stepped in 
and enacted the MDA.191   
 The MDA created a scheme of federal oversight for medical 
devices while dramatically reducing state regulation and oversight 
requirements.192 This statute provides that, after a medical device 
receives FDA pre-market approval, a state may not establish or 
enforce any requirement that (1) is different from, or in addition to, 
any requirement applicable under federal law, and (2) relates to the 
safety or effectiveness of the device.193 Accordingly, while the MDA 
preempts many state common-law tort claims, it does not preempt 
those that do not impose requirements different from or in addition to 
federal requirements. Further, the MDA permits the FDA to exempt 
certain state and local requirements from preemption.194 
 The MDA maintained the FDA requirement of pre-market 
approval prior to distribution of any medical device.195 Pre-market 
approval imposes certain specific requirements applicable to all 
medical devices, including a review of the device’s proposed 
labeling.196 Once a device has received FDA pre-market approval, it 
must be marketed without any significant differences from the 
specifications in the approval application because the FDA has 
deemed that these specifications provide a reasonable assurance of 
safety and effectiveness.197 Notably, a new medical device is not 
required to undergo pre-market approval if the FDA finds that it is a 
substantial equivalent of another device exempt from pre-market 
approval.198 
 After pre-market approval, medical devices are subject to 
reporting requirements, which include the obligation to inform the 
FDA of any new clinical investigations or scientific studies concerning 
                                                 
190 Id. 
191 Id. at 316. 
192 Id. at 312.  
193 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (2006). 
194 Id. § 360k(b). 
195 Medtronic, 552 U.S. at 313. 
196 Id. 
197 Id. 
198 See 21 U.S.C. § 360c(f)(1)(A). 
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the device that the applicant knows or reasonably should know of199 
and to report incidents in which the device has contributed to death or 
serious injury.200 The FDA may withdraw pre-market approval of any 
medical device based on newly acquired data and must withdraw 
approval if it determines that the device is unsafe or ineffective under 
its labeling conditions.201 
 The MDA imposes three different class levels of continuing 
oversight for medical devices depending on the risks presented by the 
device.202 Class I medical devices include elastic bandages and 
examination gloves and are subject to the lowest level of oversight, 
known as “general controls,” such as labeling requirements.203 Class II 
medical devices include powered wheelchairs and surgical drapes and 
are subject to general controls and “special controls,” including 
performance standards and post-market surveillance measures.204 
Class III oversight applies to medical devices that are purported to be 
for a use in supporting or sustaining human life or for a use that is of 
substantial importance in preventing impairment of human health or 
presents a potential unreasonable risk of illness or injury.205 Because 
of the nature of this class of medical devices, it receives the strictest 
federal oversight of the three.206 
 
C. Proposed Prescription Drug Preemption Clause  
 Congress should enact an express preemption clause similar to 
the MDA for prescription drugs. A similar statute would provide that, 
after a prescription drug manufacturer has received FDA pre-market 
approval, the states may not promulgate any regulations that differ 
from or impose greater restrictions than federal regulations. While this 
statute would preempt most state common-law tort claims, it would 
                                                 
199 Id. § 814.84(b)(2). 
200 Id. § 803.50(a). 
201 Id. § 360e(e)(1). 
202 See Medtronic, 552 U.S. at 316–17.  
203 Id. at 316. 
204 Id. at 316. 
205 See 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(C)(ii).  
206 Medtronic, 552 U.S. at 317. 
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not preempt those that do not impose requirements different from or in 
addition to federal requirements. Further, Congress could grant the 
FDA the power to exempt certain state and local requirements from 
preemption.207  
 A prescription drug preemption statute should maintain the 
current FDA pre-market approval regulations, which are nearly 
identical to those for medical devices. However, unlike the MDA, 
which permits a new medical device to forego pre-market approval if 
the FDA finds that it is a substantial equivalent of another device 
exempt from pre-market approval,208 all prescription drugs should be 
subject to pre-market approval because of the risk of resulting injuries 
or illnesses.   
 This proposed statute should maintain the FDA oversight 
currently in place for prescription drugs. Congress need not establish 
differing class levels for continuing oversight for prescription drugs as 
it has done in the MDA209 because all prescription drugs present a 
“potential unreasonable risk of illness or injury,” as is characteristic of 
Class III medical devices.210 Thus, all prescription drugs should be 
subject to the most extensive federal oversight. 
  
D. Effects of the Proposed Prescription Drug Preemption Clause 
 Congress’s enactment of a preemption clause for prescription 
drugs similar to the MDA would address many of the harms of the 
current preemption standard. First, an express preemption clause 
would create a uniform standard of care for manufacturers to observe. 
Manufacturers would no longer be subject to the fifty-one different 
standards of care currently in place. A uniform standard would 
inevitably lead to less tort liability for manufacturers, as it is much 
easier to comply with a single standard of care and would result in 
lower operating costs to the manufacturer. 
                                                 
207 See 21 U.S.C. § 360k(b). 
208 See id. § 360c(f)(1)(A). 
209 See Medtronic, 552 U.S. at 316–17.  
210 See 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(C)(ii).  
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 An express preemption clause would also return the decision of 
prescription drug labeling requirements to the expert judgment of the 
FDA rather than the lay jury because most state-law failure-to-warn 
claims will be preempted. This is important because FDA scientists 
thoroughly test the safety and effectiveness of prescription drugs 
before approving them for distribution211 and continue to monitor the 
safety and effectiveness of the prescription drugs throughout their 
distribution.212 Lay juries do not have the proper experience with 
prescription drug labeling to compete with the expertise of the FDA.  
 Next, an express preemption clause would reduce 
unsubstantiated warning labels. Once the FDA has approved a 
prescription drug for distribution, the manufacturer knows exactly 
what information must be included in the label. Additionally, upon 
receipt of new information, the FDA would inform the manufacturer 
of any necessary labeling changes. Accordingly, manufacturers would 
no longer have to concern themselves with providing notice to 
physicians of every possible risk, no matter how minute. 
Lastly, an express preemption clause would help reduce the 
negative effect that the current standard of preemption has on medical 
research and testing. A national standard of care will undoubtedly 
reduce manufacturers’ tort liability, which courts have found deters 
manufacturers from developing and marketing prescription drugs.213 
As a result, manufacturers will be able to research, develop, and 
market highly beneficial prescription drugs that they may not have 
otherwise considered researching and developing under the current 
standard. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The Seventh Circuit’s adoption of the Supreme Court’s strict 
“clear evidence” standard reflects a clear shift to a presumption against 
preemption. This new standard has subjected manufacturers to 
increased tort liability, which has negatively impacted the prescription 
                                                 
211 See Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1195 (2009). 
212 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(e). 
213 Carlin v. Super. Ct. of Sutter Cnty., 920 P.2d 1347, 1357 (Cal. 1996). 
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drug market. Accordingly, in order to decrease manufacturers’ tort 
liability and resolve many of the resulting harms, Congress should 
enact an express preemption clause similar to the Medical Device 
Amendments of 1976. 
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